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Real and imagined perils: A reply to Stoeber and Gaudreau (2017) 
I reply to Stoeber and Gaudreau’s (2017) recent commentary on my paper outlining the 
“perils of partialling” when examining multidimensional perfectionism (Hill, 2014). In my 
original paper I argued that the conceptual meaning of one of the two superordinate 
dimensions of perfectionism, perfectionistic strivings, may change once its relationship with 
the other superordinate dimension, perfectionistic concerns, is controlled for or partialled 
(i.e., when residual perfectionistic strivings is created and examined). In light of this 
possibility, I argued that it may be inappropriate or “perilous” to draw conclusions regarding 
perfectionistic strivings based on residual perfectionistic strivings. Stoeber and Gaudreau 
disagree. In responding to their commentary, I explain how and why our two perspectives 
differ. I argue that, despite their view to the contrary, there is sufficient reason to be 
concerned regarding the conceptual meaning of residual perfectionistic strivings. In addition, 
I also argue that Stoeber and Gaudreau have misunderstood where the peril lies when using 
partial correlations and have concluded that my paper called for a rejection of the 
examination of partial correlations when this was not the case.  
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I am grateful to Stoeber and Gaudreau for taking the time to respond to my paper 
(Hill, 2014) and receive their response in the collegial manner it was intended. I strongly 
believe in the value of open scholarly debate. It is an excellent means of encouraging critical 
reflection, progressing knowledge, and directing future research. Therefore, in the spirit of 
scholarly debate, and so to clarify a number of important issues, I provide my own rejoinder 
to Stoeber and Gaudreau’s paper. 
The aim of my response is to identify and explain issues on which we agree and 
disagree based upon the arguments I provided in my initial paper and the arguments Stoeber 
and Gaudreau provided in their riposte. My response does not address all of the issues they 
raised. Rather, it focuses on the issues which I consider key in terms of understanding our 
two perspectives. Hopefully readers find my rejoinder useful in terms of drawing their own 
conclusions regarding the “perils” of partialling. 
Background 
Before directly addressing each issue I consider important, some explanation of my 
motives for writing the initial paper may provide a helpful backdrop for the current 
disagreement. The paper to which Stoeber and Gaudreau’s commentary applies was partly 
motivated by increasing concerns I had regarding the conclusions of a number of peer-
reviewed papers that appeared at the time. I was particularly concerned by the certainty with 
which it was being concluded that perfectionistic strivings (PS) may be healthy or adaptive 
and the influence that this message may have on researchers and practitioners interested in 
perfectionism. Most notably, this included the conclusion of a paper that reviewed research in 
an area of especial interest to me, sport, which stated “only perfectionistic concerns are 
clearly maladaptive, whereas perfectionistic strivings may form part of a healthy striving for 
excellence” (Stoeber, 2011, p.1). 
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My paper was also partly motivated by other concerns that research was beginning to 
progress at pace in my primary areas of interest (sport, dance, and exercise) while, to my 
mind, a number of fundamental questions remained unanswered. In particular, what was PS 
precisely, what was “perfectionistic” about this concept, and how was it different from 
conscientiousness or other motivational variables (e.g., achievement goals)? At the time, 
similar questions had received attention from others, including Flett and Hewitt (2005, 2006, 
2007), Greenspon (2000, 2008), and Hall (2006). However, efforts to answer these questions 
in sport had treated them as questions to be resolved by conceptual scrutiny. There were far 
fewer efforts to treat these questions as empirical questions to be resolved through the 
collection of primary data. Consequently, colleagues and I began a line of research that 
attempted to do so (Hill, Hall, & Appleton, 2010, 2012). 
As part of developing this line of research, I decided to examine what I considered to 
be a misstep in this area of research. Specifically, the conclusion that PS was healthy or 
adaptive was based largely on the adaptive and maladaptive relations of residual PS. That is, 
PS having controlled for or partialled its relationship with the other major dimension of 
perfectionism, perfectionistic concerns (PC).  What is more, I believed that doing so was 
potentially problematic. I tested this assertion in the paper Stoeber and Gaudreau have 
responded to by contrasting the relationships of PS and residual PS with a range of variables. 
The findings of this study highlighted a range of differences between PS and residual PS and, 
I concluded, supported my assertion. My approach was based on an excellent paper by 
Lynam, Hoyle, and Newman (2006) in which they illustrated the interpretational difficulties, 
or perils, that can arise when using partialling to examine aggression and psychopathy. I was 
also encouraged by researchers who were highlighting similar issues when examining 
perfectionism (e.g., Molnar, Sadeva, Flett, & Coautti, 2012; Powers, Koestner, Zuroff, 
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Milyavskaya, & Gorin, 2011), as well as researchers who had scrutinised other residual 
variables such as “shame-free-guilt” and “guilt-free-shame” (Elison, 2005). 
Issue 1: The conceptual meaning of residual PS 
The main assertion in my paper was that, following partialling, the conceptual 
meaning of PS may change and therefore residual PS is not an appropriate basis on which to 
draw conclusions regarding PS. The foundation of this argument was laid by Lynam et al 
(2006) who identify various factors that influence the degree of confidence with which one 
can make inferences about an unresidualised variable (PS) based on the residualised variable 
(residual PS). In addition to a number of other factors, Lynam et al emphasised the 
importance of “theoretical tightness.” When the variables to be partialled are poorly defined, 
broad and vague (as opposed to well-defined, narrow and clear), interpretation of the residual 
variable is more difficult as it is less obvious what the new residualised variable represents 
(Lynam et al., 2006). In my paper I argued that PS was not conceptually and operationally 
well-defined because PS has historically been defined and operationalised in a broader 
manner than is sometimes appreciated. Specifically, it was evident that many researchers 
consider PS to include more than just the act of striving and includes elements of self-
evaluation that are shared with PC. In this regard, I highlighted two features, conditional self-
acceptance and self-criticism, that I considered important in terms of possible ambiguity 
surrounding PS (and ultimately the conceptual differences between PS and residual PS once 
PC is controlled for). 
In their response, Stoeber and Gaudreau argue that “it is possible to define PS and PC 
without making reference to the[se] features,” that “people can strive for perfection without 
making their self-worth contingent upon achieving perfection, or without criticizing 
themselves if they fail to reach perfection” and that these features are “better conceptualized 
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as correlates of perfectionism to be studied separately from PS and PC” (p.380). They also 
present evidence from studies that they argued illustrated that while related, correlations are 
sufficiently low between conditional self-acceptance and PS and PC to suggest it is not a 
defining feature of either.  Similarly, self-criticism is closely related only to PC but is not a 
defining feature of either PC or PS.  
In regards to this issue, I do not believe Stoeber and Gaudreau have provided a 
convincing rebuttal to my concerns regarding the conceptual ambiguity surrounding PS or the 
potential for the conceptual meaning of PS to change following partialling. Their response is 
surprisingly sparse in this regard. They merely dismiss the assertion that self-criticism and 
conditional self-acceptance are defining features of PS and PC.  They do not acknowledge or 
discuss the substantial debate and discussion surrounding PS that is evident in this area of 
research and is the basis for the concerns I raised (e.g., Flett & Hewitt, 2002, 2006; Hall, 
2006).  Therefore, at this point, I see little reason to alter my initial perspective and remain 
unconvinced that there is not at least some ambiguity surrounding PS and, therefore, residual 
PS. For the benefit of those unfamiliar with this area of research, conceptual “fuzziness” has 
historically been one of the defining features of research examining perfectionism. In the 
opening chapter of their seminal book, for example, Flett and Hewitt (2002) listed 21 terms 
that have been used to define and describe perfectionism. Moreover, discussion and debate is 
ongoing regarding a range of definition and operationization issues pertaining to 
perfectionism (e.g., Flett & Hewitt, 2007; Stairs, Smith, Zapolski, Combs, & Settles, 2012; 
Stoeber, 2016). This is evident at superordinate and subordinate levels of perfectionism. 
When providing an overview of the hierarchical model of perfectionism, its superordinate 
dimensions are defined principally by the measures that serve as their indicators (subordinate 
dimensions). This is common practice and is the case in Stoeber and Gaudreau’s paper 
(“perfectionistic striving…capture forms, aspects, and subordinate dimensions of 
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perfectionism reflecting a self-oriented striving for perfection and exceedingly high personal 
standards”, p.379). Is superordinate perfectionistic strivings a theoretically grounded, tightly 
defined, construct? Or is it defined loosely and operationalized by the content of instruments 
designed to measure other things? As useful as I think the hierarchical model is in terms of 
providing a heuristic and common language in this area (very useful), I believe it is the latter. 
The definition and operationalization of the two most common subordinate 
dimensions of PS are also subject to debate. Personal standards were conceived as “high 
personal standards of performance and the tendency to evaluate oneself based on 
performance” (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990, p.54). In reanalysing the subscale 
designed to measure personal standards, Frost and colleagues later identified a number of 
items which measured contingent self-worth and suggested that these items were perhaps 
responsible for inconsistent findings regarding personal standards and adaptive/maladaptive 
functioning (DiBartolo, Frost, Chang, LaSota, & Grills, 2004). Rather than disregarding these 
items, in concluding their paper they argued that “It would seem that personal standards are 
an essential part of the definition of the construct of perfectionism but only in as much as 
they are used by people as a gauge for determining their feelings about themselves” 
(DiBartolo et al., 2004, p.253). In addition, they recommended that future research compare 
outcomes for a “Pure Personal Standards” subscale (free from items measuring contingent 
self-worth) with their original Personal Standards subscale so to “explicate more carefully the 
relationship of standard setting to perfectionism’s basic definition” (p.253). As far as I am 
aware, this work has yet to be undertaken.  
Self-oriented perfectionism (SOP), another subordinate dimension of PS, has received 
similar scrutiny and even more intense debate. SOP is an especially complex dimension of 
perfectionism. This is evident in the writing of Hewitt and Flett (1991, 2007; Flett & Hewitt, 
2006) where the achievement striving associated with SOP is thought to conceal a strong 
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vulnerability to motivational and psychological difficulties. Moreover, unlike more healthy 
patterns of achievement striving, SOP is described as entailing a more extreme form of 
compulsive striving or hyper-conscientiousness. In terms of its operationalization, like 
personal standards, there is evidence that the subscale used to measure it may include both 
elements of striving and something more problematic and similar to contingent self-worth 
(“importance of being perfect”). Research suggests that these two sub-facets have discernibly 
different patterns of adaptive and maladaptive relations (e.g., Campbell & DiPaula, 2002; Hill 
et al., 2010; Stoeber, Kempe, & Keogh, 2008). Based on the extensive writing of Flett and 
Hewitt, both sub-facets (not one over the other) are integral to understanding this particular 
subordinate dimension of perfectionism. 
Such conceptual ambiguity is central to interpretational difficulties (and conceptual 
meaning) associated with residual PS. This is because PS shares, at least to some degree, self-
evaluative features with PC. As such, in my initial paper I stated that partialling “removed 
variance” and, consequently, residual PS “lost” some of the features important in terms of 
understanding PS. Stoeber and Gaudreau found the notion that partialling removed variance 
particularly problematic because “this suggests that common aspects are removed and 
consequently the construct is changed” (p.382) and this is not the case. However, they 
illustrate nicely how this is the case. Specifically, in their Venn diagram presented by Stoeber 
and Gaudreau (2017, p. 381), and reproduced here in Figure 1, they identify how in 
regression analysis the relationship between residual PS and the criterion variable is captured 
only by section b, rather than section b and d as would be the case if PC was not in the model. 
Section d and whatever it represented in terms of commonality/covariance between PS, PC, 
and the criterion variable is “lost” (or perhaps, more accurately, often forgotten), when 
drawing conclusions regarding PS. The implications of this loss are readily apparent in 
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research when PS is no longer a positive predictor of, say, anxiety once its relationship with 
PC has been controlled for and it is concluded that PS is unrelated to anxiety. 
Although Stoeber and Gaudreau dismissed the significance of the empirical evidence 
of the relationships between PS and PC with conditional self-acceptance and self-criticism, in 
my opinion there is enough theoretical and empirical evidence that these are important 
common features of both PS and PC (if not defining features). Take Greenspon (2000, 2008), 
for example, who argued that “the essence of perfectionism is not striving for excellence, but 
rather, feelings of conditional self-acceptance” (2000, p.202) or Hewitt and Flett (1991) who 
suggested the possibility that self-criticism may be “a response common to all forms of 
perfectionism” (p.463).  In the five studies I am aware of that have examined the relationship 
between SOP and self-acceptance correlations ranged from r = -.17 to -.46 (Flett, Russo, & 
Hewitt, 1994; Flett, Besser, Davis, & Hewitt, 2003; Scott, 2007; Hall, Hill, Appleton, & 
Kozub, 2009; Hill, Hall, Appleton, & Kozub, 2008). Similar sized correlations have also been 
found between SOP and various types of self-criticism (e.g., Dunkley & Kyparissis, 2008; 
Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Thompson, & Zuroff, 2004). Though I did not discuss this in the 
original paper, there is also the concept of self-critical perfectionism for which self-criticism 
is considered integral (Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2003). Self-critical perfectionism has 
recently been proposed to be part of a “big-three” perfectionism model (Smith, Saklofske, 
Stoeber, & Sherry, in press). In the big-three model, self-criticism is a manifest indicator of 
self-critical perfectionism. Also of note, the big-three model includes “rigid perfectionism” 
that includes SOP and “self-worth contingencies” as its manifest indicators. Clearly, the 
features I identified are at the forefront of other researchers’ minds when considering what 
others have described as “core perfectionism facets” (Smith et al., in press, p.5). 
Stoeber and colleagues argue that accepting the argument that both PC and PS share 
an association with conditional self-acceptance and self-criticism may somehow steer 
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perfectionism research in the “wrong direction” (p.380) and to a “return to one-dimensional 
conceptions of perfectionism of the 1980s” (p.381). This is because “if the characteristics PS 
share with PC are defining characteristics of PS – and if everything that is “perfectionistic” 
about PS is contained in the parts that PS share with PC – there would be little need to invest 
theoretical and empirical effort to study PS” (p380). I disagree. I do not believe my argument 
undermines the study of multidimensional perfectionism. This is because even after 
accounting for these features, there are still unique features of PS and PC that are important 
in terms of understanding perfectionism. For example, there is no personal striving element 
of PC or sense of pressure from others evident in PS. Indeed, the existence of these elements 
is a sound rationale for examining their unique effects. Stoeber and Gaudreau appear to be 
confusing one-dimensional conceptions of perfectionism (an amalgam of strivings and 
concerns) with PC and have concluded in error that the arguments I presented in my paper 
somehow preclude the study of the unique correlates, processes and outcomes of 
multidimensional perfectionism (see issue 2 below). 
Perhaps the key difference in our perspective on this matter is that, as part of the same 
broad personality characteristic, I would expect PS and PC to share at least some features and 
that these features are core to what perfectionism is (and are the basis of the “perfectionistic” 
label). Moreover, so not to confuse PS with other similar constructs or to reduce it to simply 
an act of goal setting (as Stoeber and Gaudreau’s example of students A and B appears to do, 
p.381), I think it important to locate the concept of PS in the classic writing on perfectionism 
that largely considered the striving associated with perfectionism to entail more than just high 
personal standards (e.g., Burns, 1980; Ellis, 1958; Missildine, 1963). Only by doing so can 
we ease concerns regarding the construct validity and discriminate validity of PS. By 
contrast, Stoeber and Gaudreau offer no explanation of why PS and PC are positively related, 
propose no features they might share, or explain differences between PS and other related 
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forms of achievement strivings. Instead, Stoeber and Gaudreau appear to advocate a model of 
perfectionism whereby PS and PC are orthogonal as depicted in Figure 1 in Stoeber and Otto 
(2006, p.296). This does not accurately depict the relationship between PS and PC evident in 
research because they are presented as unrelated. It does, however, depict the relationship 
between residual PS and PC. I am sure the merits and shortcomings of an orthogonal model 
of multidimensional perfectionism would be keenly debated if the theoretical and empirical 
basis for such an approach was presented. In particular, whether, if this is the case, PS and PC 
are different personality traits rather than different dimensions of the same trait. In the 
meantime, researchers must be mindful of the positive relationship between PS and PC.  
Issue 2: Imagined perils and partialling 
Stoeber and Gaudreau state that in response to the finding that residual PS showed 
larger adaptive relations than PS, I concluded that “partialling PS is ‘perilious’ because 
removing  PC from PS makes PS look more adaptive than they actually are” (p.381). 
Moreover, this implies the correlations associated with residual PS are “less real or less valid 
than those estimated with raw scores of PS” and portrays partialling as “statistical trickery 
that has no correspondence in (or relevance for) the real world” (p.381). 
On this issue, Stoeber and Gaudreau appear to believe that the “perils of partialling” 
to which the title of my paper refers pertains to using partialling generally. This is not the 
case. So to avoid any confusion, and to be clear, the peril lies in the interpretational 
difficulties that can arise following partialling when the intention is to use a residual variable 
(i.e., residual PS) as the basis for conclusions regarding a non-residual variable (i.e., PS). 
Partialling holds no perils in any general sense. In addition, partial correlations are not in any 
way less real, valid, or relevant to the real world. The subsequent exposition of partialling 
provided by Stoeber and Gaudreau is very useful. They go beyond what was provided in my 
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paper by illustrating how partial correlations are influenced by both the size/direction of the 
relationships between PS and PC, as well as the size/direction of their respective relationships 
with a criterion variable. They also helpfully explain what is meant by “controlling” or 
“partialling” and how to interpret partial correlations (e.g., when individuals score the same 
level of PC, those with higher PS report lower anxiety). I am sure this will aid researchers in 
gaining a better understanding of partial correlations (and ease any concerns regarding any 
“trickery” associated with the approach). However, their exposition does not speak to the 
issue at hand. That is, whether knowing that individuals with the same level of PC but higher 
levels of PS (i.e., residual PS) are typically better off allows us to conclude that those with 
higher PS are typically better off. This was the issue at the centre of my paper.  
Issue 3: Baby and the bathwater 
Stoeber and Gaudreau suggest that by raising concerns regarding the use of partialling 
that I am in some way “rejecting” (p.380) an approach that has served perfectionism research 
so well over the last three decades and that this is “premature, if not entirely inappropriate” 
(pp.380).  
On this issue, the suggestion that I reject the examination of partial correlations is 
incorrect. I stated clearly at the outset of the paper when initially discussing the perils of 
partialling that the perils (i.e., interpretational difficulties) described “are avoided if the 
research question focuses on combined, unique, or incremental predictive ability” (p.3). 
Moreover, the perils were confined only to specific circumstances whereby researchers 
sought to draw conclusions regarding the original variables (PS) based on the residualised 
variable. In fact, so concerned was I by the possibility that some readers may erroneously 
believe that I was discouraging the use of the approach, I also stated when concluding the 
paper that “research that has utilised partialling in this area has provided a number of 
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conceptual and empirical advances in our understanding and will continue to do so” (p.12). 
Colleagues and I recently reiterated this point again elsewhere when discussing 
partialling,“…it is useful to reaffirm our belief in the obvious value of this approach and its 
continued use…without this approach, it would be not be possible to test important and 
interesting research questions regarding perfectionism (and across the field of psychology 
generally, of course). In particular, questions pertaining to the unique effects…characteristics, 
processes, and outcomes… would be missed without adopting such an approach” (p.143, 
Jowett, Mallinson, & Hill, 2016). 
If further evidence is required of the value I place in examining partial correlations, 
one only needs to consider the considerable time colleagues and I have recently spent 
calculating partial correlations as part of meta-analyses and systematic reviews (Hill & 
Curran, 2016; Jowett et al., 2016). Consequently, rather than being at odds with Stoeber and 
Gaudreau regarding the importance of this approach, I am in agreement. The similarity of our 
positions on this issue is readily apparent when the statements from my previous work above 
are compared to Stoeber and Gaudreau own conclusions (“…partialling is essential if we 
want to understand the shared, unique, combined, and interactive relations of different 
dimensions of perfectionism”, Stoeber et al., 2017, p.2). This hopefully also explains why, as 
pointed out by Stoeber and Gaudreau, colleagues and I have been happy to use this approach 
is the studies they cite (Hill & Curran, 2016; Hill et al., 2008; Hill, Hall, Appleton, & Murray, 
2010). This includes adopting the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism (Hill, 2013; Hill & Davis, 
2014). My research group were among the first to adopt and test the 2 × 2 model in sport and 
have subsequently provided three of the seven published studies that exist in sport, dance, and 
exercise examining the model (see Gaudreau, 2016). We believe it is a valuable addition to 
this area of research and will continue to test the 2 × 2 model when our focus in on the 
interactive effects of PS and PC. 
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Issue 4: The case of perfectionistic concerns 
Stoeber and Gaudreau observed that “…researchers often ignore that partialling also 
affects the relations of PC” (p.12) and that they found the argument that the effect partialling 
has on PC was “less controversial” (Hill, 2014, p.310) to be “peculiar” (p.383). They offered 
three reasons why they believe the same concerns regarding partialling are not normally 
expressed for PC. Firstly, “The differences between PC and residual PC are usually not as 
large as those between PS and residual PS.” Secondly, “PC do not become less maladaptive 
when PS are partialled out…[or] turn maladaptive relations into adaptive relations.”. Thirdly, 
“the effect that partialling has on PC—making PC more maladaptive—is consistent with the 
traditional view of perfectionism as a personality disposition that is essentially maladaptive… 
In contrast, the effect that partialling has on PS—making PS more adaptive—is inconsistent 
with the traditional view [of perfectionism].” What is more, they believe researchers “should 
take greater note of these effects” (p.384). 
I am in agreement with Stoeber and colleagues that the influence partialling has on PC 
has received less attention and, to a lesser degree, why this is the case. The first two reasons 
they offer, to me, are reasonable grounds for paying less attention to residual PC. The higher 
degree of similarity between residual PC and PC and the more uniform changes in adaptive 
and maladaptive relations following partialling (decreasing adaptive relations and increasing 
maladaptive correlations) make the case of PC somewhat different from PS. Of note, you do 
not typically see changes in direction of the relationship between PC and criterion variables 
following partialling (as is the case of PS). As such, whereas within Lynam et al.’s (2006) 
framework the changes observed for PS following partialling pose the “greatest interpretative 
hazard” (p.330), the changes observed for PC are “the simplest and least problematic” 
(p.330). In agreement, the lesser influence of partialling on PC has even led some to argue 
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that in some contexts “… it is relatively safe to examine perfectionistic concerns without 
statistically controlling for perfectionistic strivings” (Stoeber & Damian, 2016, p. 267).  
The lack of perceived controversy on my part also stemmed from issues that have 
caused the greatest disharmony among researchers and practitioners in this area. Unlike PS, 
there is little debate regarding PC or disagreement regarding the likely consequences of PC. I 
have yet to read any work that has not argued PC are problematic and suggest that PC need to 
managed/treated, as opposed to possibly encouraged. By contrast, casual perusal of research 
in this area will inevitably lead readers to numerous issues regarding healthy versus 
unhealthy perfectionism and particularly PS. These issues tend to feature heavily when 
researchers are tasked with summarising perfectionism research or given the opportunity to 
reflect on this area of research (e.g., Flett & Hewitt, 2016; Hall, 2016; Sirois & Molnar, 
2016). In sum, these two issues seem to me to be a reasonable basis on which to describe the 
effect partialling has on PC to be “less controversial.” 
In terms of reconciling findings from partialling with a traditional view of 
perfectionism, from my experience researchers have not typically found it difficult to accept 
findings that residual PS is associated with desirable and adaptive relations. These findings 
are quite clear. The difficulty lies in making conceptual sense of PS and therefore residual 
PS. As a backdrop to resolving this difficulty, numerous peer-reviewed papers and book 
chapters have been dedicated to explaining the achievement striving associated with 
perfectionism and explaining why this is more likely to be unhealthy than healthy (e.g., Hall, 
2016; Hall, Hill, & Appleton, 2012; Flett & Hewitt, 2016). This work includes careful 
explanation of mediating and moderating factors that need to be taken into account when 
considering the likely implications of perfectionism, generally, and PS, specifically. By 
contrast, in response, there have been few attempts to explain why this is not the case, why 
PS are adaptive, and how PS are different from other similar constructs. In the absence of 
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such explanations, there is a danger that we will come to be guided by “naked empiricism” 
rather than theory and logical reasoning when considering the likely consequences of 
perfectionism.  
Concluding comments 
My paper on the perils of partialling in context of multidimensional perfectionism was 
intended to stimulate discussion and critical reflection among researchers interested in 
perfectionism. I note that in addition to Stoeber and Gaudreau’s thoughtful response, there is 
evidence that as a consequence of my paper researchers have become more mindful of the 
perils of partialling and careful in the conclusions they are making regarding PS (e.g., Rice, 
Richardson, & Ray, 2016; Smith et al., 2016; Flett & Hewitt, 2014). This includes work by 
Stoeber and colleagues (Madigan, Stoeber, & Passfield, 2015, 2016; Stoeber, Kobori, & 
Brown, 2014). While there are areas of disagreement between my positon and the position of 
Stoeber and Gaudreau on a number of issues relating to PS (but seemingly not so on 
partialling generally), I am sure they would agree that this more discerning approach is a 
positive development. Likewise, I believe their paper will encourage others to reflect on their 
current practice and improve understanding of perfectionism. However, despite the clear 
value of their response, I remain steadfast in the belief that partialling is perilous if residual 
PS is used as the basis of conclusions regarding PS.  
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         Figure 1. Venn diagram representing the shared variance of perfectionistic strivings 
(PS), perfectionistic concerns (PC), and an outcome variable (Y). Partialling controls 
for the shared variance of PS and PC indicated by a + d and uncovers the unique 
relations that PS (indicated by b) and PC (indicated by c) have with Y. Reprinted from 
Personality and Individual Differences, 104, J. Stoeber & P. Gaudreau, The advantages 
of partialling perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns: Critical issues and 
recommendations, 379-386, Copyright Elsevier (2016). 
 
 
